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1. Kedar S. Bhatia, Stat Pack for October Term 2016, SCOTUSBLOG, 8,
16 (June 28, 2017), http://scotusblog.com/wp-content/
uploads/2017/06/SB_Stat_Pack_2017.06.28.pdf. 
2. See id. at 6.
3. 137 S. Ct. 1421 (2017).
4. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
5. Kindred Nursing Centers, 137 S. Ct. at 1427.
6. 137 S. Ct. 1718 (2017).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
8. Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 1721.
9. Id. at 1725.
During the Supreme Court’s October 2016 Term, newsrelating to Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency—including his successful nomination of Neil Gorsuch to
fill the vacancy created by Justice Antonin Scalia’s death more
than one politically eventful year earlier—frequently over-
shadowed news of the Court’s rulings. The Court itself con-
tributed to that redirection of the nation’s attention: it decided
more than 30 fewer cases than its recent average, and it
achieved unanimity at an unusually high rate.1 With 68% of
the Court’s rulings falling on the civil side of the ledger,2 how-
ever, we have much here to discuss, with significant new rul-
ings in the areas of arbitration, debt collection, disabilities and
education, discovery sanctions, equal protection, fair housing,
false claims, family law and veterans benefits, jurisdiction,
patents, religion, sovereign immunity, speech, takings, and the
Trump Administration’s “travel ban.”
ARBITRATION
The Supreme Court’s long-running campaign to bring state
courts into compliance with the Federal Arbitration Act con-
tinued this past Term with its ruling in Kindred Nursing Centers
Limited Partnership v. Clark.3 Exercising their respective pow-
ers of attorney, Janis Clark and Beverly Wellner had completed
the paperwork necessary to move family members into a Ken-
tucky nursing home. The contracts with the nursing home
stated that all controversies concerning the family members’
stay at the facility would be resolved through binding arbitra-
tion, rather than through litigation. When the family members
died not long thereafter, Clark and Wellner brought suits
against the nursing home on behalf of the decedents’ estates.
Were those suits contractually barred? The Kentucky Supreme
Court held they were not. A power of attorney does not
empower a representative to enter into an arbitration agree-
ment, Kentucky’s high court reasoned, unless it contains a
statement explicitly conferring that authority. Otherwise, the
Kentucky justices said, agents could waive their principals’
core constitutional rights of access to the courts and trial by
jury.
Led by Justice Kagan, the Court unanimously reversed. In a
prior ruling concerning the FAA’s requirements, the Court had
explained that “courts must place arbitration agreements on an
equal footing with other contracts” and that arbitration agree-
ments thus cannot be invalidated “by defenses that apply only
to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an
agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”4 Justice Kagan explained that
the Kentucky Supreme Court had violated these principles
when it held that, absent a clear statement to the contrary, a
power-of-attorney contract cannot confer the power to waive a
principal’s right to sue or to invoke his or her right to a jury
trial. “Such a rule is too tailor-made to arbitration agreements—
subjecting them, by virtue of their defining trait, to uncommon
barriers—” Justice Kagan wrote, “to survive the FAA’s edict
against singling out those contracts for disfavored treatment.”5
DEBT COLLECTION
The Court handed down two significant rulings this Term
on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. In his first opinion
for the Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch led his colleagues in unan-
imously rejecting a claim brought by debtors who believed that
their rights under the Act had been violated. The case, Henson
v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc.,6 featured a debt collector—
Santander—that had purchased defaulted auto loans from Citi-
Financial Auto and then deployed collection methods that the
debtors found legally objectionable. The Act places method-
ological restraints upon (among others) anyone “who regularly
collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due . . .
another.”7 The parties agreed that the statute applies to agents
who attempt to collect debts on behalf of creditors, and they
also agreed that the statute does not ordinarily apply to those
who attempt to collect debts that they themselves originated.
But what about someone who—like Santander—purchases
debts originated by others and then seeks to recover on those
debts for its own financial benefit?
“[B]y its plain terms,” Justice Gorsuch wrote, the statutory
language at issue brings within the Act’s scope “third party col-
lection agents working for a debt owner—not . . . a debt owner
seeking to collect debts for itself.”8 This is true, Justice Gor-
such said, regardless of whether the debt owner “originated the
debt or came by it only through a later purchase.” As for the
debtors’ argument that Congress would have wished to bring
the Act to bear on debt purchasers if it had known that this
“new industry would blossom,” Justice Gorsuch stressed that
“it is never our job to rewrite a constitutionally valid statutory
text under the banner of speculation about what Congress
might have done had it faced a question that, on everyone’s
account, it never faced.”9
Suppose a debt collector asserts a right to be paid on a
credit-card debt and that, on the face of the claim, it is clear
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that the statute of limitations for collecting the debt has
expired. Does the assertion of the claim amount to a “false,
deceptive, or misleading representation” or an “unfair or
unconscionable means” of attempting to collect a debt, in vio-
lation of the Act?10 In Midland Funding, LLC v. Johnson,11 the
Court held that such a claim does not violate the federal statute
when the claim is asserted in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceed-
ings. In that context, Justice Breyer reasoned for the majority,
there are a variety of protections that help to ensure that the
patently stale claim will be rejected. The Court reserved judg-
ment, however, on whether the Act bars “a debt collector’s
assertion in a civil suit of a claim known to be stale”— a setting
in which a consumer might easily be duped into paying a time-
barred debt in order to avoid litigation.12 Joined by Justices
Ginsburg and Kagan, Justice Sotomayor dissented, arguing that
a debt collector violates the Act when it attempts to collect a
debt that it knows is time-barred. Faced with a contrary ruling
by a majority of their colleagues, the dissenting justices urged
Congress to amend the legislation.
DISABILITIES AND EDUCATION
Through a variety of federal statutes, Congress has aimed to
protect the interests of children with disabilities. Prominent
among those statutes are the Individuals with Disabilities Edu-
cation Act, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. A provision of the
IDEA—20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)—states that, even if suing under a
statute other than the IDEA, a disabled child must first exhaust
the IDEA’s administrative procedures if he or she is “seeking
relief that is also available under [the IDEA].” The Court was
asked to interpret the meaning of that exhaustion provision in
Fry v. Napoleon Community Schools.13 A child with cerebral
palsy had sued a school after it refused to allow her to bring
her service dog on the premises. The child sued under Title II
of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, but did
not first exhaust the IDEA’s administrative procedures. Was the
failure to exhaust a problem?
Pointing out that the IDEA’s “principal command” is that
disabled children be provided with what the statute describes
as “a free appropriate public education” (commonly called a
FAPE),14 Justice Kagan explained in her opinion for the Court
that the IDEA’s exhaustion requirements only apply when “the
gravamen” of the plaintiff’s complaint concerns a school’s
alleged failure to provide a FAPE.15 To help lower courts deter-
mine whether a given complaint fits that description, Justice
Kagan offered a couple of diagnostic questions:
First, could the plaintiff have brought essentially the
same claim if the alleged con-
duct had occurred at a public
facility that was not a
school—say, a public theater
or library? And second, could
an adult at the school—say,
an employee or visitor—have
pressed essentially the same
grievance? When the answer
to those questions is yes, a
complaint that does not
expressly allege the denial of
a FAPE is also unlikely to be
truly about that subject [and so the IDEA’s exhaustion
requirements will not apply].16
The Court remanded for an application of those principles.
Joined by Justice Thomas in a short opinion concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito worried that the
majority’s two diagnostic questions would confuse the lower
courts. Those questions, Justice Alito wrote, evidently presume
that “there is no overlap between the relief available under” the
IDEA, on the one hand, and the relief available under the ADA,
the Rehabilitation Act, or some other federal law, on the other.17
During his Senate confirmation hearings for a seat on the
Court, then-Judge Gorsuch took some heat from critics18 for
authoring a Tenth Circuit opinion stating that, to satisfy the
FAPE requirements of the IDEA, the educational benefits being
provided to a disabled student by a school “must merely be
‘more than de minimis.’”19 That criticism was not altogether fair;
as the internal quotation marks in the prior sentence indicate,
Gorsuch was invoking the standard previously adopted by the
Tenth Circuit, although it also is true that he added the word
“merely” to the formulation. With or without that adverbial
modifier, the Tenth Circuit’s standard is no longer good law. 
In Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District RE-120—a case
concerning a Tenth Circuit ruling in which Gorsuch did not
participate, but in which his framing of the Tenth Circuit’s
standard had been deployed—the Court unanimously held
that the Tenth Circuit had failed to interpret the IDEA and the
Court’s own precedent appropriately. Writing for the Court,
Chief Justice Roberts explained that, to satisfy the IDEA’s man-
date, “a school must offer an [individualized education pro-
gram, or ‘IEP’] reasonably calculated to enable a child to make
progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”21
Although an IEP need not be “ideal,” Chief Justice Roberts
wrote, it “must aim to enable the child to make progress” and
thus must be “constructed only after careful consideration of
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the child’s present levels of
achievement, disability, and
potential for growth.”22 By
requiring that a disabled child’s
educational program be “appro-
priately ambitious in light of
his circumstances,” the IDEA
imposes a requirement that “is
markedly more demanding
than the ‘merely more than de
minimis’ test applied by the
Tenth Circuit.”23
DISCOVERY SANCTIONS
Imagine you are a federal judge presiding over a tort lawsuit
in which the plaintiffs allege that a defective tire manufactured
by the defendant caused their motorhome to crash. After sev-
eral years of discovery, the parties settle. Months later, the
plaintiffs learn that—despite discovery requests that were
squarely on point—the defendant had concealed internal test
results indicating that the tire grew unusually hot at highways
speeds. The plaintiffs return to your courtroom, urging you to
order the defendant to pay all of the attorney’s fees and other
litigation costs that the plaintiffs incurred after the defendant’s
first refusal to disclose the test results. Does your inherent
power to impose sanctions for litigation misconduct extend
that far?
That was the question before the Court in Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Haeger.24 The district court in that case had
awarded the plaintiffs $2.7 million, covering all of the fees and
costs that the plaintiffs had paid after Goodyear’s first dishon-
est response to a discovery request concerning Goodyear’s
internal tests on the G159 tire model. The Ninth Circuit
affirmed, but the Supreme Court unanimously reversed. Draw-
ing heavily from the Court’s 1994 ruling in Mine Workers v.
Bagwell,25 Justice Kagan explained that—regardless of whether
a court is imposing sanctions pursuant to a rule of civil proce-
dure, 28 U.S.C.§ 1927, or the court’s inherent sanctioning
authority—sanctions “must be compensatory rather than
punitive in nature.”26 “[P]retty much by definition,” Justice
Kagan wrote, that means that a “court can shift only those
attorney’s fees incurred because of the misconduct at issue.”27
When making that causal assessment, a district court has con-
siderable discretion. If presented with an “exceptional” case,
for example, the but-for standard “permits a trial court to shift
all of a party’s fees, from either the start or some midpoint of a
suit, in one fell swoop.”28 In this particular case, however, the
record did not support a finding “that disclosure of the heat-
test results would have led straightaway to a settlement.”29
Notwithstanding the internal test results, Goodyear still could
have argued that the plaintiff’s tire failed for reasons attribut-
able to the plaintiffs themselves (such as failing to replace it
after it had worn down), and, in a separate lawsuit concerning
a G159 tire, Goodyear had disclosed the test results and nev-
ertheless proceeded to trial. The court thus remanded for
application of the proper analysis.
EQUAL PROTECTION
Immigration
For more than half a century, the nation’s immigration laws
treated unwed U.S. citizen mothers significantly more favor-
ably than it treated (and still treats today) unwed U.S. citizen
fathers in determining the citizenship of children born abroad.
For such a father to transfer American citizenship to his child,
he must have resided in the United States for five or more years
before the child’s birth, and at least two of those years must
come after the father reaches the age of fourteen. For a child
born abroad to a U.S. citizen father before November 14, 1986,
the requirement is even more demanding: the father must have
resided in the United States for ten or more years prior to the
child’s birth, with at least five of those years coming after the
father reached the age of fourteen. If a child was born abroad
to an unwed U.S. citizen mother, however—whether before or
after 1986—the statutory requirement was far more lenient:
the child became an American citizen so long as the mother
had resided in the United States for at least one year prior to
the child’s birth.
The Court declared that arrangement unconstitutional in
Sessions v. Morales-Santana,30 though the news for the claimant
in that case was nevertheless ultimately unfavorable. Luis
Ramón Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic
in 1962 to unwed parents. Morales-Santana’s father—but not
his mother—was an American citizen. Yet Morales-Santana’s
father had fallen twenty days short of meeting the lengthy,
statutorily imposed residence requirement for obtaining Amer-
ican citizenship for his son. Later facing deportation as a result
of criminal convictions, Morales-Santana challenged the
statute’s differing treatment of unwed mothers and fathers,
contending that it violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal pro-
tection principles.
Led by Justice Ginsburg, a majority of the Court agreed.31
Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court found that the
statute’s distinction between mothers and fathers lacked the
necessary “exceedingly persuasive justification.”32 The Court
concluded that the distinction—first drawn in the mid-twenti-
eth century—was the result of an anachronistic assumption
that mothers are children’s primary guardians and that fathers
commonly play little or no role in shaping children’s values
and civic attachments:
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Fearing that a foreign-born child could turn out more
alien than American in character, the [Franklin Delano
Roosevelt] administration believed that a citizen parent
with lengthy ties to the United States would counteract
the influence of the alien parent. Concern about the
attachment of foreign-born children to the United States
explains the treatment of unwed citizen fathers, who,
according to the familiar stereotype, would care little
about, and have scant contact with, their nonmarital
children. For unwed citizen mothers, however, there
was no need for a prolonged residency prophylactic: The
alien father, who might transmit foreign ways, was pre-
sumptively out of the picture.33
The Court’s ruling on the merits of Morales-Santana’s claim
left the justices with a choice: should they extend the benefits
of the one-year residence requirement to children born abroad
to unwed U.S. citizen fathers (as Morales-Santana desired), or
should they instead declare that children born abroad to
unwed U.S. citizen mothers become American citizens only if
their mothers meet the lengthier residence requirement previ-
ously imposed only on fathers? The Court chose the latter
option. The decision hinged, Justice Ginsburg explained, on
what Congress would have desired if it had known that its
mother-father distinction would be struck down as unconsti-
tutional. The Court found that “all indicators” suggest Con-
gress would have wished to retain the lengthier residence
requirement.34 Morales-Santana himself thus failed to benefit
from the Court’s ruling.35
Legislative Redistricting
The Court handed down several important rulings this Term
concerning the Equal Protection Clause and legislative redis-
tricting. First up was Bethune-Hill v. Virginia Board of Elections,36
in which the Court clarified a portion of the analysis that
applies when determining whether a state permissibly took race
into account when drawing the boundaries of its legislative dis-
tricts. Virginia conceded that, when setting the boundaries of
eleven of its districts in the wake of the 2010 census, one of its
goals was to ensure that each of those districts would have a
black voting-age population of at least 55%. Such action will
draw strict scrutiny if race was the predominant factor that the
state used when placing voters inside or outside the challenged
districts. Was it? The lower court held that race was not the pre-
dominant factor because the eleven districts’ boundaries could
have been drawn in precisely the same way using traditional,
constitutionally permissible criteria. 
Led by Justice Kennedy, the 6-2 Court reversed and
remanded. “The racial predominance inquiry concerns the
actual considerations that pro-
vided the essential basis for the
lines drawn,” Justice Kennedy
explained, “not post hoc justifi-
cations the legislature in theory
could have used but in reality
did not.”37 Of course, when the
placement of districts’ lines does
conflict with traditional criteria,
it might be quite easy for a chal-
lenger to establish an equal-pro-
tection claim. But “a conflict or
inconsistency between the
enacted plan and traditional redistricting criteria is not a
threshold requirement or a mandatory precondition in order
for a challenger to establish a claim of racial gerrymander-
ing.”38 Rather than find that race did predominate here and
that strict scrutiny was thus appropriate, the Court remanded
for an application of the proper legal analysis. Given the state’s
admission that it tried to ensure a black voting-age population
of at least 55%, Justices Alito and Thomas would have held
that race did indeed predominate and that strict scrutiny
should apply.39
The second of the Court’s redistricting cases this Term was
Cooper v. Harris,40 a case concerning North Carolina’s District
1 and District 12. Neither of those districts had a majority
black voting-age population before redistricting, but both of
them routinely elected candidates favored by a majority of
black voters. The state added a substantial number of African-
American voters to both districts, pushing their black voting-
age populations beyond 50%. In an effort to rebut allegations
of unconstitutional racial gerrymandering, North Carolina
officials argued that the changes to District 1 were necessary to
comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and that race had
not played a predominant role in the selection of voters for
District 12. A three-judge district court rejected both of those
defenses. Led by Justice Kagan, the Supreme Court affirmed.
With respect to District 1, the evidence made it clear that
those leading the redistricting effort wished to create a major-
ity-minority district, and so the Court quickly turned its atten-
tion to whether there was a compelling justification for taking
race predominantly into account. North Carolina argued that
there was—namely, avoiding vote dilution in violation of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. In election after election in District
1, however, numerous white voters had helped elect candi-
dates favored by most blacks, and so the state did not have
“good reasons” to fear that blacks’ voting strength in that dis-
trict was at risk of dilution.41 With respect to District 12—a
storied district making its fifth appearance before the Court—
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the state argued that partisan-
ship, rather than race, had been
the basis for drawing the dis-
trict’s lines, and that lawmakers
had simply opted to pack that
district with Democrats.
Reviewing the district court’s
contrary factual findings only
for clear error, the Court
rejected the state’s argument.
The redistricting plan’s lead
architects had said at various
points that they were focusing
on race, for example, and one
expert witness concluded that
race, rather than partisanship, far better explained the state’s
choice of district lines.
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, Justice
Alito concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part.
He agreed that North Carolina violated the Equal Protection
Clause when redrawing District 1’s boundaries, but accepted
the state’s party-focused explanation of its reasons for redraw-
ing District 12. On behalf of the majority, Justice Kagan replied
that Justice Alito had ignored the clear-error standard of review
and that his opinion “tracks, top-to-bottom and point-for-
point, the testimony of . . . the State’s star witness at trial—so
much so that the dissent could just have block-quoted that
portion of the transcript and saved itself a fair bit of trouble.”42
North Carolina v. Covington43 was another racial gerryman-
dering case from the Tar Heel State, this one featuring a district
court’s finding that state officials had unconstitutionally drawn
twenty-eight legislative districts’ boundaries along racial lines.
In a separate order, the Court summarily affirmed the district
court’s ruling on the merits of the plaintiff’s claims.44 In this per
curiam ruling handed down the same day, however, the Court
unanimously vacated the district court’s remedial order. In
addition to setting a deadline by which new legislative bound-
aries needed to be drawn, the district court had ordered that
the two-year terms of certain legislators be cut in half, had
ordered that special elections be held for specified legislative
seats, and had partially suspended the North Carolina Consti-
tution’s requirement that a legislative candidate live for one
year in a district before being elected to represent it. Without
taking a position on whether those remedial measures were
justified, the Court held that, before imposing those remedies,
the district court needed to engage in a more thorough, case-
specific analysis of the equitable considerations at stake. 
Same-Sex Marriage
Two years ago, in one of its most widely noted rulings of the
past half century, the Court ruled in Obergefell v. Hodges45 that
the Fourteenth Amendment—through a combination of equal-
protection and substantive-due-process principles—grants
same-sex couples the right to marry and to have their marriages
recognized in all states. On the closing day of its most recent
Term, the Court issued a 6-3 per curiam opinion summarily
reversing a ruling by the Arkansas Supreme Court concerning
same-sex marriages and birth certificates. When two women in
separate same-sex marriages gave birth in Arkansas, the
Arkansas Department of Public Health refused to list the non-
birth spouses as parents on the children’s birth certificates. The
Court ruled in Pavan v. Smith46 that this flatly violated Oberge-
fell’s declaration that states must provide same-sex couples with
“‘the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to mar-
riage.’”47 Joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, Justice Gorsuch
dissented, arguing that the case merited full briefing and argu-
ment, that Obergefell had not squarely addressed the constitu-
tional propriety of birth-certificate regimes like Arkansas’s, and
that it was “very hard to see what [wa]s wrong with” the
Arkansas Supreme Court’s conclusion “that rational reasons
exist for a biology based birth registration regime.”48
FAIR HOUSING ACT
In Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami,49 Miami officials
claimed that Bank of America and Wells Fargo had discrimi-
nated against Latino and African-American home-loan bor-
rowers in a variety of ways, and that this discrimination
resulted in lower tax revenues and higher municipal expenses
for the city. Could Miami bring an action against the two banks
under the Fair Housing Act? The answer to that question
turned on at least two things: whether the city’s claims fell
within the zone of interests that Congress intended to protect
when enacting the FHA and whether the city’s harms had been
proximately caused by the banks’ alleged FHA violations. The
court answered the first of those two inquiries in the affirma-
tive and remanded the second for further consideration.50
Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer reminded readers that,
when bringing a federal statutory claim, a federal plaintiff must
meet the standing requirements of Article III and must show
that it possesses a cause of action under the statute. To meet
the latter requirement, a plaintiff must show that its interests
at least arguably “‘fall within the zone of interests protected by
the law invoked.’”51 The FHA broadly permits suit by “any per-
son . . . who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory
housing practice” or who “believes that [it] will be injured by
a discriminatory housing practice that is about to occur.”52 By
using such capacious language, Justice Breyer wrote, Congress
extended the pool of potential FHA plaintiffs to the full limits
of what Article III allows.
With respect to causation, the Court was less definitive. The
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Eleventh Circuit had concluded that the city met the FHA’s
causation requirement by pleading injuries that were the fore-
seeable result of FHA violations. The Supreme Court found,
however, that the FHA is more demanding:
In the context of the FHA, foreseeability alone does
not ensure the close connection that proximate cause
requires. The housing market is interconnected with
economic and social life. A violation of the FHA may,
therefore, be expected to cause ripples of harm to flow
far beyond the defendant’s misconduct. Nothing in the
statute suggests that Congress intended to provide a
remedy wherever those ripples travel.53
But beyond indicating that there needed to be some kind of
“direct” connection between an alleged FHA violation and the
plaintiff’s harm, the court declined “to draw the precise bound-
aries of proximate cause under the FHA.”54 None of the courts
of appeals had yet addressed that issue, and so the Court opted
to give them the first shot at tackling it.
FALSE CLAIMS ACT
The False Claims Act’s qui tam enforcement provision
enables a private party (a “relator”) to bring an FCA action on
behalf of the federal government against an individual whom
he or she believes has “knowingly present[ed to the govern-
ment] . . . a false or fraudulent claim for payment or
approval.”55 The FCA further states that “[t]he complaint shall
be filed in camera [and] shall remain under seal for at least 60
days.”56 In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. United States ex rel.
Rigsby57—a case concerning allegations that, in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, State Farm fraudulently tried to shift some
of its wind-insurance liabilities to the federal government—the
Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a violation of
the FCA’s seal requirement mandates dismissal of a relator’s
complaint. In an opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court unani-
mously found that dismissal is not required, but rather is
among the remedies that a district court may deem appropri-
ate in its discretion.
FAMILY LAW AND VETERANS’ BENEFITS
Howell v. Howell58 concerned an issue that looms large when
dealing with the distribution of veterans’ benefits between
divorcing spouses. When John and Sandra Howell divorced in
1991, the divorce decree declared that Sandra would receive
half of John’s Air Force retirement pay. That arrangement was
permissible under the Uniformed Services Former Spouses’
Protection Act, which declares
that states may treat veterans’
“disposable retired pay” as com-
munity property divisible
between divorcing spouses.59
More than a decade later, the
Department of Veterans Affairs
determined that John suffered
from a partial disability resulting
from his military service, enti-
tling him to disability benefits.
Under federal law, however,
John could receive those disability benefits only if he agreed to
take a corresponding reduction in the retirement pay that he
and Sandra had been dividing.60 John agreed to that arrange-
ment, surely appreciating the fact that, unlike veterans’ ordi-
nary retirement pay, veterans’ disability benefits are statutorily
exempt from federal, state, and local taxation.61 Of course, by
making that choice, he reduced the amount of his monthly
retirement pay that Sandra received each month. Unhappy with
the cut in her monthly payments, Sandra asked an Arizona fam-
ily court to order John to make up the difference. The family
court agreed to do so and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed.
Led by Justice Breyer, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. As
the Court explained in 1989’s Mansell v. Mansell,62 Congress
has declared that states cannot treat as divisible community
property any amount of retirement pay that a veteran has
waived to receive disability benefits.63 (Congress has thereby
ensured that the financial benefits of disability payments go
entirely to the veteran himself or herself.) By ordering John to
make up for the reduction that his waiver had yielded in San-
dra’s share of the retirement pay, Justice Breyer explained, Ari-
zona’s courts tried to do what Congress has explicitly forbid-
den. Justice Breyer closed by “not[ing] that a family court,
when it first determines the value of a family’s assets, remains
free to take account of the contingency that some military
retirement pay might be waived, or . . . take account of reduc-
tions in value when it calculates or recalculates the need for
spousal support.”64
JURISDICTION
The Court handed down several noteworthy cases this Term
concerning state and federal courts’ jurisdiction. In BNSF Rail-
way Co. v. Tyrrell,65 the Court held (over the lone dissent of
Justice Sotomayor) that the Montana Supreme Court erred
when it determined that the courts of that state could exercise
personal jurisdiction over BNSF Railway Company.66 The issue
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arose when two former BNSF
employees sued the company
in a Montana state court for
injuries they allegedly suffered
while on the job. Because the
employees’ claims did not flow
from actions occurring in
Montana, the inquiry focused
on general, rather than spe-
cific, jurisdiction. Relying par-
ticularly upon its 2014 ruling
in Daimler AG v. Bauman,67
Justice Ginsburg explained for
the Court that a state court
may take general jurisdiction
over a corporation without
fear of violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause only when the corporation is incorporated in that state,
when its principal place of business is in that state, or when
“‘exceptional’” circumstances indicate that the corporation’s
activities in that state are “‘so substantial and of such a nature
as to render the corporation at home in that State.’”68 BNSF did
own more than 2,000 miles of track in Montana and did
employ more than 2,000 employees there. But when consid-
ered against the backdrop of BNSF’s entire operations, those
facts were not sufficient to establish that BNSF was “‘essen-
tially at home’” in Montana.69 BNSF’s contacts with Montana
would suffice to establish specific personal jurisdiction in a
case concerning BNSF’s activities in Montana, but they were
not enough to create general personal jurisdiction there.
The focus shifted to specific jurisdiction in Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California.70 In that case, nearly
680 individuals filed actions against Bristol-Myers Squibb in
California for injuries they allegedly suffered from taking the
defendant’s Plavix, a blood-thinning drug. Eighty-six of those
plaintiffs resided in California, and, as to them, there was no
jurisdictional question. The remainder of the plaintiffs, how-
ever, came from 33 other states. Did the Fourteenth Amend-
ment’s Due Process Clause permit California’s courts to take
specific jurisdiction of the non-Californians’ claims? The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court concluded that it did, reasoning that a
“sliding-scale approach” was appropriate: the greater the num-
ber of contacts between a defendant and a forum state, the
looser may be the connection between the defendant’s activi-
ties in the forum and the plaintiffs’ claims. Here, although Bris-
tol-Myers did not design, manufacture, package, or label Plavix
in California, it did have numerous other contacts with the
state, and the non-Californians’ claims were similar to those
filed by the California residents. For the California Supreme
Court, there thus was a sufficient, jurisdiction-establishing
connection between California and the activities giving rise to
the non-Californians’ claims.
Over the lone dissent of Justice Sotomayor (just as in BNSF
Railway), the Supreme Court rejected the California Supreme
Court’s framework and conclusion. Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Alito explained that California’s “sliding-scale” framework
was nothing more than “a loose and spurious form of general
jurisdiction.”71 The decisive factor cutting against jurisdiction
here was the fact that there simply was no connection between
California and the activities giving rise to the non-Californians’
claims. Those plaintiffs had not purchased, taken, or been
injured by Plavix in California, and the fact that their claims
were similar to claims filed by Californians was irrelevant. The
Court “le[ft] open the question whether the Fifth Amendment
imposes the same restrictions on the exercise of personal juris-
diction by a federal court.”72 Writing in dissent, Justice
Sotomayor argued that “there is nothing unfair about subject-
ing a massive corporation to suit in a State for a nationwide
course of conduct that injures both forum residents and non-
residents alike,”73 and she warned that the majority’s ruling
would have justice-thwarting consequences in cases in which
a defendant has injured plaintiffs in numerous states.
In Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc.,74 the Court turned its
attention to issues of standing and intervention of right under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Must a party seeking to
intervene under that rule independently meet Article III’s famil-
iar standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressabil-
ity if the existence of an Article III “case” or “controversy” has
already been established in the underlying litigation? Laroe
Estates had sought to intervene in litigation concerning a real-
estate development project that went south allegedly as a result
of unlawful actions by municipal officials in Chester, New York.
Like the original plaintiff, Laroe wished to assert a regulatory
takings claim against the town. The Second Circuit held that,
because the original plaintiff had standing under Article III,
Laroe did not itself need to satisfy Article III’s requirements. 
Resolving a circuit split on the relationship between Article
III and Rule 24(a), the justices vacated the Second Circuit’s
judgment. Writing for the unanimous Court, Justice Alito
began by reminding readers that, when a plaintiff brings an
action against a defendant in federal court, it must establish
Article III standing for each of its claims and for each form of
relief that it seeks. The same principle holds, Justice Alito
explained, when a case features multiple plaintiffs: “[a]t least
one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form of relief
requested in the complaint.”75 The Court held that the same
logic applies when a party seeks to intervene under Rule 24(a):
“[A]n intervenor of right must have Article III standing in
order to pursue relief that is different from that which is sought
by a party with standing.”76 Laroe thus would need to meet
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Article III’s requirements if it was seeking “a money judgment
of its own running directly against the Town.”77 The Court
remanded for a determination of whether that was, indeed, the
form of relief that Laroe sought.
In Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortgage Corp.,78 the Court consid-
ered whether a statutory sue-and-be-sued clause regarding the
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie May) gives
federal district courts subject-matter jurisdiction to hear all
claims concerning Fannie May, or whether it merely gives Fan-
nie May the capacity to file lawsuits and to be sued by others.
The statutory language at issue authorizes Fannie May “to sue
and to be sued, and to complain and to defend, in any court of
competent jurisdiction, State or Federal.”79 Resolving a circuit
split, the Court unanimously determined that the statute does
not provide an independent source of federal jurisdiction. The
Court’s analysis turned primarily upon the statute’s use of the
phrase “any court of competent jurisdiction.” By virtue of that
language, Justice Sotomayor explained, the statute merely
“permits suit in any state or federal court already endowed
with subject-matter jurisdiction over the suit.”80
Suppose federal plaintiffs file claims on their own behalf
against a defendant, as well as claims on behalf of a class they
propose to represent. Suppose, further, that the district court
refuses to certify the class, after which the plaintiffs voluntar-
ily agree to the dismissal of their individual claims with preju-
dice but then appeal the denial of class certification. Does the
federal appellate court have jurisdiction? That was the ques-
tion before the Court in Microsoft Corp. v. Baker,81 in which
owners of Microsoft’s Xbox game console filed design-defect
claims on behalf of themselves and a proposed class of Xbox
owners. After the district court struck their class allegations—
the functional equivalent of denying a motion for class certifi-
cation—the plaintiffs appealed the district court’s ruling on the
class claims, arguing that the Ninth Circuit should take juris-
diction under Rule 23(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. That rule gives federal appellate courts the discretionary
power to take jurisdiction of orders granting or denying class
certification—interlocutory orders that ordinarily would oth-
erwise be appealable only under the stringent circumstances
described in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). The Ninth Circuit refused to
take the case, but the plaintiffs were undeterred. In an effort to
render the case appealable as of right under 28 U.S.C. § 1291—
the familiar statute that gives courts of appeals jurisdiction to
review district courts’ “final decisions”—the plaintiffs then
stipulated to the dismissal of their individual claims with prej-
udice and appealed the district court’s ruling striking their
class allegations. The Ninth Circuit determined that Section
1291 did indeed give it jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’
appeal. The court then ruled that the district court abused its
discretion when it struck the
plaintiffs’ class allegations.
All eight of the Court’s par-
ticipating justices rejected the
Ninth Circuit’s finding that it
had jurisdiction, though they
disagreed about the nature of
the error. Writing for the five-
member majority, Justice Gins-
burg determined that the Ninth
Circuit lacked jurisdiction
because the district court’s ruling dismissing the plaintiffs’
individual claims was not a “final decision” within the mean-
ing of Section 1291. To rule otherwise, Justice Ginsburg rea-
soned, would allow plaintiffs to manufacture finality in the
face of what is otherwise plainly an interlocutory ruling on
class certification, and would disrupt the balance of interests
struck in Rule 23(f). Concurring in the judgment and joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, Justice Thomas con-
cluded that the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ indi-
vidual claims was an appealable “final decision[]” within the
meaning of Section 1291, because that ruling left the district
court with no further work to do.82 Justice Thomas neverthe-
less found that the plaintiffs’ appeal failed to satisfy the case-
or-controversy requirements imposed by Article III. “[I]t has
long been the rule,” he wrote, “that a party may not appeal
from the voluntary dismissal of a claim, since the party con-
sented to the judgment against it.”83
PATENTS
It was a busy Term for the Court in the area of patents, and
a correspondingly unhappy Term for the Federal Circuit,
which suffered reversals in six of its seven cases reviewed by
the Court.84 We will take a short look at three of those rever-
sals. Perhaps the most important of them came in Impression
Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc.,85 a case asking
whether a patent holder can use patent law to control the
downstream use of a product after the patent holder sells it.
Lexmark owns various patents for toner cartridges that it man-
ufactures and sells. It sells those cartridges at a discount if the
purchaser contractually agrees to return the empty cartridges
to Lexmark, rather than transferring them to another company
in the business of refilling and selling cartridges. Many Lex-
mark cartridges sold under those terms nevertheless found
their way into the hands of Impression Products, a company
that refills and sells other companies’ used toner cartridges.
Lexmark sued Impression Products for patent infringement,
arguing that, “because it expressly prohibited reuse and resale
of those cartridges, [Impression Products and other companies
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in the same line of work]
infringed the Lexmark patents
when they refurbished and
resold them.”86 The Federal Cir-
cuit held that Lexmark could sue
Impression Products for patent
infringement, but the Supreme
Court reversed. Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Roberts
explained that, while Lexmark
might have a breach-of-contract
action when a customer disre-
gards its promise to return an
empty cartridge to Lexmark,
Lexmark fully exhausts its patent
rights at the moment of sale. “A
patentee is free to set the price
and negotiate contracts with
purchasers,” Chief Justice
Roberts wrote, “but may not, ‘by virtue of his patent, control
the use or disposition’ of the product after ownership passes to
the purchaser.”87 The Court further held that the patent-
exhaustion rule applies to goods sold domestically and inter-
nationally alike.
In Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. v. Apple Inc.,88 the Court was
asked to settle a disagreement about the meaning of Section
289 of the Patent Act, which imposes liability upon any person
who “sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to
which [a patented] design or colorable imitation has been
applied.”89 The Court unanimously held that, when dealing
with a multicomponent product, the phrase “article of manu-
facture” can refer either to the entire product or to a single
component of it. The Federal Circuit had thus erred when it
concluded that, as a remedy for Samsung’s infringement of
some of Apple’s design patents for the iPhone, Apple was nec-
essarily entitled to all of the profits Samsung had made from
sales of its infringing smartphones (rather than just to the prof-
its Samsung had made from sales of the infringing components
themselves). The Court left it to the Federal Circuit, on
remand, to determine “whether, for each of the design patents
at issue here, the relevant article of manufacture is the smart-
phone, or a particular smartphone component.”90 Appearing as
an amicus, the United States had proposed a test for making
that determination, but the Court preferred not to make any
decision about the appropriate test in the absence of full brief-
ing on the issue.
The Federal Circuit suffered another reversal in Life Tech-
nologies Corp. v. Promega Corp.91 That case concerned Section
271(f)(1) of the Patent Act, which imposes patent-infringe-
ment liability upon anyone who, from within the United
States, supplies “all or a substantial portion of the components
of a patented invention” for combination outside the United
States.92 Life Technologies had shipped one component of a
five-component invention from the United States to the United
Kingdom, where the components were combined to make the
final patented product. Focusing on the statutory phrase “all or
a substantial portion,” the Federal Circuit had held that the
component supplied from within the United States was an
especially important piece of the patented puzzle, that the
component was thus a “substantial” piece of the puzzle, and
that Life Technologies had thus violated Section 271(f)(1). The
Supreme Court reversed, finding that the meaning of the term
“substantial” in this context is quantitative, rather than quali-
tative, in nature, and that the statute “does not cover the sup-
ply of a single component of a multicomponent invention.”93
RELIGION
In one of its most widely anticipated rulings of the Term,
the Court held in Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v.
Comer94 that Missouri could not categorically exclude a
church-run daycare from competing for a state grant to resur-
face its playground. Through Missouri’s Scrap Tire Program,
the state offered a limited number of grants to help organiza-
tions resurface their playgrounds with material made from
recycled tires. In an effort to comply with its strong constitu-
tional commitment to the separation of church and state, how-
ever, Missouri disqualified all churches and other religious
organizations—including the Trinity Lutheran Church and its
daycare—from competing for one of the grants. Defending that
disqualification, the state relied heavily upon the Court’s 2004
ruling in Locke v. Davey,95 in which the Court ruled that the
State of Washington could refuse to provide scholarship funds
to a student pursuing a degree in devotional theology.
In an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court
ruled that Missouri’s categorical exclusion violated Trinity
Lutheran’s rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise
Clause. In Locke, Chief Justice Roberts explained, the student
“was not denied a scholarship because of who he was; he was
denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do—use
the funds to prepare for the ministry.”96 Trinity Lutheran, how-
ever, had been denied the opportunity to compete for a grant
“because of what it is—a church.”97 In this important respect,
the Court found, Trinity Lutheran had suffered the same sta-
tus-based injury that had been declared unconstitutional in
1978’s McDaniel v. Paty.98 In that case, the Court struck down
a Tennessee law that categorically barred ministers from serv-
ing as delegates to the state’s constitutional convention.
In a footnote about which we undoubtedly will hear more
in the future, Chief Justice Roberts stated that “[t]his case
involves express discrimination based on religious identity
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with respect to playground resurfacing,” and that the Court
was not “address[ing] religious uses of funding or other forms
of discrimination.”99 Joined by Justice Thomas, Justice Gor-
such refused to join that footnote (thereby reducing it to the
status of a plurality opinion), because it could provide a basis
for greatly restricting the precedential reach of the Court’s
opinion. Joined by Justice Gorsuch, Justice Thomas wrote sep-
arately to express dissatisfaction with the Court’s prior ruling
in Locke—dissatisfaction that animated portions of Justice
Gorsuch’s separate opinion, as well.
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment, arguing that, just
as the Free Exercise Clause would not permit a state to deny
policy and fire protection to a church, so too it bars a state
from excluding churches “from participation in a general pro-
gram designed to secure or to improve the health and safety of
children.”100 Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Sotomayor in dis-
sent, arguing that the Establishment Clause does not permit
Missouri to provide direct funding to Trinity Lutheran (just as
it would not permit the state to pay for repairs to the church’s
walls or pews), and that the Court’s ruling on the Free Exercise
Clause was faithful neither to Locke nor to much of the nation’s
legal history.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The Court resolved two issues in memorably named Lewis
v. Clarke,101 one concerning the scope of tribal sovereign
immunity and the other concerning the doctrine of sovereign
immunity more generally. The issues arose from a simple set of
allegations. Brian and Michelle Lewis claimed that, while dri-
ving on Interstate 95 in Connecticut, they were rear-ended by
William Clarke, an employee of the Mohegan Tribal Gaming
Authority who was driving customers of the Mohegan Sun
Casino to their homes. When the Lewises sued Clarke in his
individual capacity in a Connecticut state court, Clarke argued
he was protected by tribal sovereign immunity. He offered two
rationales for invoking that defense: he was acting within the
scope of his tribal duties at the time of the accident, and the
Mohegan Tribe had statutorily agreed to indemnify tribal gam-
ing employees for losses they suffered as a result of their neg-
ligent on-the-job conduct. The Connecticut Supreme Court
embraced the first rationale, but the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected both.
Writing for the Court,102 Justice Sotomayor first determined
that there was no reason to extend the sovereign-immunity
defense to tribal employees under circumstances in which the
defense would not extend to state and federal employees.
Under well-settled principles, Justice Sotomayor explained, the
availability of sovereign immunity as a defense turns in large
part on whether a governmental employee has been sued in his
or her official or individual capacity. Suits against employees in
their official capacities are really suits against their sovereign
employers, and so sovereign
immunity in in play. When an
employee has been sued in his
or her personal capacity, how-
ever, it is the employee—and
not the employer—that is the
real party in interest.
Justice Sotomayor next
observed that this case pre-
sented the Court with its first
opportunity “to decide whether
an indemnification clause is
sufficient to extend a sovereign
immunity defense to a suit
against an employee in his indi-
vidual capacity.”103 The Court
made short work of that question, answering it in the negative.
“The critical inquiry,” Justice Sotomayor wrote, “is who may be
legally bound by the court’s adverse judgment, not who will
ultimately pick up the tab.”104 In an individual-capacity law-
suit, a court’s judgment binds the employee, not the sovereign
employer—and that remains true even when the sovereign has
volunteered to make its employees whole for losses they suffer
as a result of negligently carrying out their job duties.
SPEECH
Those awaiting a major ruling concerning the intersection
of the Internet and the First Amendment’s Speech Clause got
at least part of what they wanted in Packingham v. North Car-
olina.105 Lester Packingham had posted a statement on Face-
book, thanking God that a court dismissed his traffic ticket.
The problem? As a convicted sex offender, Packingham was
barred by North Carolina law from accessing social network-
ing sites like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn (and possibly
also sites like Amazon, Washingtonpost.com, and WebMD). In
an opinion joined by the Court’s Democratic appointees, Jus-
tice Kennedy observed that cyberspace had joined streets and
parks as a key place where Americans routinely go to inquire,
speak, listen, learn, and protest. Turning to the intermediate
scrutiny appropriate for content-neutral speech regulations,
the Court found that the law burdened substantially more
speech than was necessary to achieve its goal of protecting
children from sexual abuse. The statute’s prohibition was
“unprecedented in the scope of First Amendment speech it
burdens,” Justice Kennedy wrote, and “no case or holding of
this Court has approved of a statute as broad in its reach.”106
Joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice
Alito concurred in the judgment. Because North Carolina’s law
“precludes access to a large number of websites that are most
unlikely to facilitate the commission of a sex crime against a
child,”107 Justice Alito agreed that the statute burdened sub-
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stantially more speech than
necessary. He declined to join
the majority’s opinion, how-
ever, because Justice Kennedy
had appeared to equate the
Internet with streets and parks.
There are differences between
the Internet and physical
spaces, Justice Alito observed:
parents can monitor their chil-
dren’s physical locations and
in-person contacts more easily
than they can monitor their
kids’ Internet traffic, for exam-
ple, and criminals can cloak
themselves in anonymity more
easily online than they can in person. For Justice Alito, those
differences suggested that the Court should proceed cautiously
before appearing to indicate that the First Amendment restricts
states’ ability to regulate speech on the Internet just as vigor-
ously as it restricts their ability to regulate speech in traditional
public forums. Justice Kennedy agreed that caution was appro-
priate, but for him that caution ran largely in the opposite
direction: he worried that the Court would be too slow to
acknowledge all of the speech-facilitating implications of the
Internet revolution.
Packingham was not the Court’s only noteworthy decision
concerning the freedom of speech this year. In its sole affir-
mance of the Federal Circuit this Term, the Court agreed with
that court’s finding that a federal statute strayed into unconsti-
tutional territory when it authorized the government to with-
hold a trademark on the ground that it may “disparage . . . per-
sons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols,
or bring them into contempt, or disrepute.”108 In Matal v.
Tam,109 the Patent and Trademark Office had relied upon that
statute when refusing to register “The Slants” as an Asian
band’s trademark. The Federal Circuit found the statutory pro-
vision facially unconstitutional, and—led in part by Justice
Alito—the Supreme Court agreed. In a portion of the opinion
joined by all eight of the participating justices, Justice Alito
began by eviscerating the government’s suggestion that regis-
tered trademarks are government speech and thus beyond the
reach of First Amendment limitations. In a passage attracting
only a plurality, Justice Alito then found that, even if the case
was governed by the somewhat more relaxed scrutiny appro-
priate for regulations of commercial speech—a question the
plurality found unnecessary to resolve—the statutory language
here was plainly unconstitutional. The First Amendment does
not permit the government to restrict speech merely on the
ground that it will offend or demean people on the basis of
their race, ethnicity, sex, or other trait. Joined by Justices Gins-
burg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, Justice Kennedy concurred in
part and concurred in the judgment, finding that the statute
impermissibly discriminated based upon viewpoint.
TAKINGS
In Murr v. Wisconsin,110 the Court confronted a potentially
tricky question that sometimes arises when trying to deter-
mine whether a regulatory taking has occurred: When evaluat-
ing the extent to which government regulation has reduced the
value of an owner’s property, what is the unit of property on
which that analysis should focus? The facts in Murr illustrate
the problem. In successive years, siblings in the Murr family
together acquired two adjacent parcels of land in Wisconsin.
To help pay for improvements on one of the lots, the siblings
wished to sell the other. A Wisconsin regulation stated, how-
ever, that when adjacent lots were held under common owner-
ship, none of the lots could be separately sold or developed
unless it contained at least one acre of land suitable for devel-
opment. The lot that the siblings wished to sell did not meet
that requirement. Did the restriction amount to a compensable
taking under the Fifth Amendment? The answer to that ques-
tion depended largely on how one defined the property at
issue: should a court look at the diminution in value of the sin-
gle lot that the Murrs could not sell (in which case there likely
would be a taking), or should a court look instead at the
diminution in value of the two lots taken together?
Writing for the majority, and emphasizing that “[a] central
dynamic of the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence . . . is
its flexibility,”111 Justice Kennedy concluded that what ulti-
mately mattered was the regulation’s impact on the value of the
two lots taken together. In reaching that conclusion, the
majority did not narrowly focus—as Chief Justice Roberts and
Justices Thomas and Alito, in dissent, would have had it—on
whether Wisconsin law continued to define the two lots as sep-
arate parcels of land. Rather, Justice Kennedy concluded that a
court should examine numerous factors:
These include the treatment of the land under state
and local law; the physical characteristics of the land;
and the prospective value of the regulated land. The
endeavor should determine whether reasonable expecta-
tions about property ownership would lead a landowner
to anticipate that his holdings would be treated as one
parcel, or, instead, as separate tracts. The inquiry is
objective, and the reasonable expectations at issue
derive from background customs and the whole of the
legal tradition.112
After examining each of those factors, the Court concluded
that it should treat the Murr siblings’ two lots as a single par-
cel of land, and that no compensable taking had occurred.
THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S “TRAVEL BAN”
Laying the groundwork for what will likely be one of its
most significant rulings next Term, the Court in Trump v. Inter-
national Refugee Assistance Project113 agreed to review lower
courts’ decisions temporarily enjoining enforcement of the
Trump Administration’s “travel ban.” The executive order
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being challenged seeks to limit the flow of refugees into the
United States and (with case-by-case exceptions) seeks tem-
porarily to bar the entry of nationals from Iran, Libya, Somalia,
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. Oral arguments on those matters are
slated to be heard early in the Court’s October 2017 Term.
Pending its review, the Court partially granted the Govern-
ment’s request to stay enforcement of the lower courts’ injunc-
tions. Until the Court says otherwise, the injunctions remain
in place only for those who possess a “bona fide relationship
with a person or entity in the United States.”114 That is, the
injunctions are effective only for those who have either “a
close familial relationship” with a person in the United States
or a formal, documented relationship with an entity in the
United States (such as a student’s relationship with a univer-
sity, a worker’s relationship with an employer, or a lecturer’s
relationship with an audience). Joined by Justices Alito and
Gorsuch, Justice Thomas concurred in part and dissented in
part, arguing that the Court should have stayed the enforce-
ment of the injunctions in their entirety.
OTHER NOTABLE RULINGS
In McLane Co., Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission,115 the Court determined that “a court of appeals
should review a district court’s decision to enforce or quash an
EEOC subpoena” for abuse of discretion, rather than de
novo.116
In Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc.117—a case fea-
turing a copyright dispute between two makers of cheerleader
uniforms—the Court held that “a feature of the design of a
useful article is eligible for copyright if, when identified and
imagined apart from the useful article [as with the decorations
on the uniforms at issue here], it would qualify as a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work either on its own or when fixed in
some other tangible medium.”118
Resolving a circuit split and a disagreement among the
members of the Texas Court of Appeals, the Court determined
in Water Splash, Inc. v. Menon119 that the Convention on the
Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in
Civil and Commercial Matters (also known as the Hague Ser-
vice Convention) does not forbid the international service of
process by mail.
In Kokesh v. SEC,120 the Court resolved another circuit split
by unanimously holding that, when the Securities and
Exchange Commission orders disgorgement in an enforcement
proceeding, it is imposing a “penalty” within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 2462, and any such action for disgorgement thus
must be brought within the five-year period established by that
statutory provision. In a footnote, the Court cautioned readers
that it was not stating “an opinion on whether courts possess
authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceed-
ings,” but was instead only addressing the reach of Section
2462’s limitations period.121
In another securities case—California Public Employees’
Retirement System v. ANZ Securities, Inc.122—the Court ruled
that the three-year time bar established by Section 13 of the
Securities Act of 1933 is a statute of repose, rather than a
statute of limitations, and thus is not subject to equitable
tolling on behalf of investors who opt out of a timely filed
putative class action but fail to file their own complaints the
time bar.
LOOKING AHEAD
At the time of this writing, several politically charged cases
are looming especially large for the Court’s October 2017 Term:
Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project123 and Trump v.
Hawaii,124 on the Trump Administration’s “travel ban”; Gill v.
Whitford,125 on partisan gerrymandering; and Masterpiece
Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission,126 on the
scope of a baker’s religious freedom to refuse to make wedding
cakes for same-sex couples. There will, of course, be a host of
others, on issues ranging from whether Iranian property on
loan to the University of Chicago can be seized to satisfy a
judgment against Iran arising out of a 1997 bombing in
Jerusalem,127 to whether Congress may bar the states from
repealing their bans on sports gambling.128
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